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The discourse of a Large Scale Organizational Transformation: The Reengineering of IBM 1989-1994.
Abstract: In this paper we examine an organizational discourse on radical transformation by identifying and analyzing management narratives claiming to be representative of different organizational stakeholders. We do this from the perspective of Stakeholder Agency Theory (Hills and Jones 1996) and by employing analytical approaches typical of hermeneutics, historical analysis and the sociology of action. It concludes by offering current managers lessons from the experience at IBM and prospective topics and suggestions for other researchers.
I . INTRODUCTION
1 st vignette: In 1991-1993 IBM was hemorrhaging cash. For the first time in its history it had slipped from a position of absolute market dominance and profitability and had lost more than $11 billion US despite having cut more than a third of its global workforce. The board of directors responded by replacing the current CEO with an outsider to IBM who promptly declared that he was the advocate of the shareholders and that things would change. The urgent requirement that IBM return to profitability justified a reduction in force of almost 150,000 people worldwide, the sale of assets and plants and a substantial restructuring of the organization from the top down. Thus begins a discourse of required radical transformation at IBM.
What is a discourse? It may be considered as an intention of a subject to communicate with an intended audience. This first view is called the "psychological interpretation" of discourse as introduced by Schleiermacher in his General Hermeneutics (1810) in which he analyzes Aristotle's De Interpretatio. This definition is consonant with a classical analysis of literature in which the text is considered to be the result of the intention of the author to communicate with a reader. This is true also of traditional management in which an executive presents a discourse about strategy or corporate results through plans, reports and other explicit statements of management intention (Ansoff, 1965) .
In information systems development the functional view of a requirement may be considered a discourse in which a user (subject) communicates intentions to the developer (agent). (Sommerville, 1996; Davis, 1982) There is another way to consider discourse in which the authorship of the text is less important than the influence of language and civilization. This is called "grammatical interpretation" Again this approach is from Schleiermacher (1810) and his referances to Homer's Iliad and Odyssey. This second way describes that of the sociology of language in which the subject may disappear (Derrida, 1991) . The subject is replaced by a wider context including the author's role or social position and in which power is expressed through rules and norms (Foucault 1972) . In this sense "grammatical interpretation" gives way to "contextual interpretation". In this characterization the author with its subjectivity is replaced by " an obscure set of anonymous rules." (Foucault, 1972, pg. 210 ). An extension of this position, and one often taken in the IFIP WG 8.2 research community, is one where organizations are given to be text analogs. (Boland, 1985 , 1991 and 1997 referencing Ricoeur 1975 Palmer, 1979; Klein and Truex 1991; Truex 1993) . Therefore organizations can be analyzed through hermeneutic analysis. This is an interesting and fruitful view, but it is also a problematic view.
It is problematic because the original hermeneutics recommended that any interpretation of a discourse or a text should use both psychological and grammatical interpretations. The first considers the discourse as the intention of an author to communicate with an audience. It is the product of an author (psychological interpretation). In the second approach a discourse is a linguistic production in which social context speaks through the grammar of the author's language (grammatical interpretation) (Schleiermacher, 1810 ). An application of the original and pluralistic approach to the analysis of discourse applied to organizational life is provided by the Sociology of Action. (Touraine, 1965) Moving closer to the interests of the IFIP 8.2 community, an important and persistent organizational discourse in management science in the management and IS literature is one given to organizational change and the role of Information Technology (I.T.) as provocateur of this change (Hammer and Champy, 1993) . As examples of the current discourse we are told that managers intend to transform organizational structure in order to move "beyond bureaucracy" (Bennis, 1993) and towards "lateral and flexible organizations" (Galbraith, 1994) . The target structure of that transformation has been described by Toffler (1977) an "adhocracy" and by Mintzberg (1979) as an "innovative structure". These normative descriptions provide little help in u nderstanding how transformation happens. Accordingly, this paper explores the links between discourse about organizational transformation and IT through a variety of theoretical linkages.
To begin we ask two questions: 1) What is the linkage between t he discourse about organizational transformation through I.T. and the theory of organizational structure? 2) What is the link with IS development methods and organizational transformation methods? These give rise to a more precise research question that will be presented in the following theoretical section. The paper then proceeds to a methodological section driven by two epistemological questions.
First, is it possible to jointly apply the two interpretations of discourses in the I.S. field as proposed by general hermeneutics? And second, what are the consequences for IS research methodology in relation with methods in history and sociology? Finally, in an empirical section we apply these theoretical and methodological ideas to discourse arising in a well-known and concrete organizational transformation, the reengineering of the IBM Corporation in the period 1993-1994. We close with conclusions and acknowledgement of further research.
II-The Theoretical Backdrop
The typical discourse regarding organizational transformation is one in which management is portrayed as a rational actor choosing to design, control and manage organizational change through the redesign of organizational process and the implementation of information technology (Nadler and Tushman, 1988) . But this "psychological interpretation" can be completed by a "contextual interpretation" where the management discourse itself is shaped by other forces that can be linked to the views and behaviors of other organizational actors. In Agency Theory (Jensen and Mekling, 1976 ) the behavior of a management as an organizational actor can only be understood by considering him as an "agent" serving on behalf of one external actor called the "primary", e.g., the shareholder. An alternative version of Agency Theory, i.e., Stakeholder Agency Theory (Hills and Jones, 1996) holds that management remains an agent but now becomes one at the service of a larger set of stakeholders. Those stakeholders include shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, and local communities. In this theory, local communities are the advocate of issues such as the environment, the quality of life, urbanization, schools and other community infrastructures and the like. This suggests that there exist more than one relevant and 'valid' narrative describing any organizational transformation.
But the number of narratives is not boundless; rather there is a limited set of such narratives. Each of the narratives is shaped by the particular knowledge and political interests that are o ften beyond the creator of the discourse. This principle is called the "garbage can" principal (Cohen, March and Olson, 1972) Ultimately these actors seek to impose an organizational structure that best serves their own interests (Mintzberg, 1979) . In addition to shaping the organizational structure, the way performance is measured can also serve the interests of a given actor. For instance privileging profit gives advantage to the finance function, elevating growth as the measure advantages operational managers and so on. Does this "garbage can" principle apply also in the dimension of performance measures? Does it apply to organizational transformation methods? And does it apply to I.S. development methods?
Thus we arrive at the larger research question represented in figure 1 below. Specifically, how may we understand the relationship between the discourse of each organizational actor, each of the stakeholders, that suggested by organizational theory, notions of performance measurement and, finally, methods of IS development method and organizational transformation. First we must examine each of the elements and to define how we mean them for the purposes of this work. 
2.1-Actors and stakeholders
Mintzberg's theory of organizational actors (1979) describes five types of actors: analysts, professional, executive, middle managers and experts. The three last categories may be simply called "managers." In Agency Theory only the middle m anagers (as for instance in the case of IBM, geographical and product divisions heads) and executives correspond to the "agent". However, the "analysts", who include accountants, controllers, auditors, consultants, planners, may also be recognized as advocates of the shareholders and thus may be considered 'agents' in the same sense. The "professionals" are advocates of the employees because as employees themselves they view themselves in dual roles; namely, as actors and stakeholders. The case of the "experts" is a bit more complex. They are project managers, R&D managers, intrapreneurs, or change agents of the enterprise. Accordingly one can claim that they represent the customer's interests. But they also represent high-performing employees because they are themselves high-level professionals. The last organizational actors, the executives, are supposed to be held to a higher standard. The executives are the "agent" of all others stakeholders, (Hills and Jones, 1996) . Because executives are hired (and dismissed) by shareholders, it is not surprising that they are attentive to these stakeholders. But, as managers, they should also represent the interests of the customers. And, as most powerful organizational actor and as insiders within the nexus of decisions, they should be the actor in advocating for the local communities (Figure 2 ). But as we shall see this is not often the case. 
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2.2-Actors and structures
Organizational theory as proposed by Mintzberg has the potential to bridge the gap between organizational stakeholders and their knowledge interests as represented through various organizational forces, coordination modes and organizational structures. Mintzberg offers a typology of coordination mechanisms which take into account Cohen, March and Olson's (1972) ideas of how organizational actors impose power. Through this typology we see how organizational actors try to influence or impose coordination mechanism that are most favorable for them. In Mintzberg's initial presentation of this typology the interests of local communities are not considered. However in later work (1989) he adds a sixth organizational structure that he terms: the missionary structure. This structure, inspired by Japanese enterprise, has an important sense of "mission", and of "citizenship"; both concepts that can be interpreted as a contribution to local communities. 
2.3-Actors and management systems
We next consider the representation of organizational structure through two dimensions. The first is the dimension of the centralization vs. decentralization of power, an important distinction in classical organization theory (Chandler, 1962) . The second dimension represents management systems as being organic vs. mechanistic. (Mintzberg, 1979 ) (c.f., figure 4). These dimensions help characterize the degree of participation (Burns and Stalker, 1961) and of hierarchy. A mechanistic management system, for instance, say one coordinating through rules and plans is much more hierarchical than an organic management system which uses face to face coordination through ad hoc meetings. This seems to hold whether the organization is centralized or decentralized (Galbraith, 1977) . Though this dichotomy it is possible to link each actor to its preferred structure as to the stakeholder represented. We propose a representation of the preferred management system (and decentralization) for each actor and stakeholder as presented in ( Figure 5 ). 
DECENTRA -LIZATION
2.4-Actors and performance measurement
Structure is also linked to performance measures. For instance analysts prefer functional structures and see bureaucracy as the most efficient structure, it is because they see cost reduction as the prime performance measure. For them cost reduction is performance. This illustrates how, as mentioned earlier each actor and each stakeholder have differing interests and performance measures. It has been pointed out that there exists a contradiction between the espoused goal and in performance between shareholders and management in agency theory (Jensen and Mekling, 1976) . That contradiction relates to performance measures preferred by senior managers as compared to those preferred by stockholders. To escape the gazing eye of owners, top management will often privilege growth, with increased complexity and diversity in part to allow uninhibited management freedom. Recent events with the ENRON Corporation illustrate this point. Enlarging this view to stakeholders-agency theory (Hills and Jones, 1996) the employees are more interested in growth than in profit because growth helps assure wage and job security. They may also be interested in organizational l earning in order to have access to continuing education and knowledge management, thus improving their own marketability and hence security. Local communities, as actors, should be also interested in growth, because they benefit from employment. The position of executives and the experts is more complex with regard to performance measures. The experts, as innovators must be oriented towards an adaptation to the environment, whether it is a competitive advantage or an organisational learning (Galbraith, 1994 ; Argyris and Schoen, 1978) . The executive, who is supposed to be the agent of all the other stakeholders, must take in account every type of performance measurement. The net of this milieu is that while middle managers and shareholders focus on productivity, all the others stakeholders prefer flexibility because of the importance they place on the organizational adaptation to its environment (Table 1 
2.5-Actors and linkages to IS development methods
If stakeholders try to impose their preferred structure, then what is the consequence on the choice of method? It is through a linkage between method and organizational structure. (c.f., figure 6 ). Methods mirror organizational structures through their characteristics of process and of content (Monod, 1997) . The implementation of each IS development method leads to a project that can be analysed as a kind of organizational structure and lend themselves best to particular organizational environments. For instance, structured methodologies themselves are centralized and mechanistic. Whereas socio-technical approaches like ETHICS (Mumford, 1983) or MULTIVIEW (Avison and Wood-Harper, 1990 ) are more decentralized and organic. So in a way the management system of the transformation project is foreshadowed by the management system of the target structure. It is unlikely that one might construct an organic target structure (e.g., entrepreneurial or innovative) with a mechanistic development method (Truex et al 1999) . 
DECENTRA-LIZATION
2.6-Actors and organizational transformation methods
The argument in 1.5 above can be extended to organizational transformation methods. (figure 7) wherein organizational transformation techniques and methods lead to structures through the management system of the transformation project. Each actor is likely to try to impose the organizational transformation method that lead to the structure that best serve its interests. 
DECENTRA-LIZATION
III-METHODOLOGY
By linking the intended discourse of each type of organizational actor to its portrayal of stakeholders and espoused stakeholder interests, organizational theory, performance measurement and IS development and organizational transformation methods (figure 8) we may begin to answer our initial t wo questions and our primary research question. Namely, understanding the relationship between the discourse of each organizational actor and each of the stakeholders. This paper arises from ongoing research in which the authors are collecting and examining sets of stakeholder narratives given in organizational actor discourse. The methodology uses history, general hermeneutics, post-modernist sociology and sociology of action as methodological referents. It arises out of a longitudinal field study and action research project wherein one of the authors was a key member of the reengineering methodology team during the period described in this research. The second author was studying the impact of the reengineering process in one manufacturing and design setting as part of his dissertation research. Thus the various sources and points of contemporaneous observation have the unusual advantage of having a top-down and bottom-up perspective.
As in all historical analysis, this research relies on numerous sources. We do not refer to these sources simply as 'data' because that connotes something more sterile and less of a messy human construction. We prefer the more classical reference to 'sources', which are the various productions of social action including art, architecture and texts (Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1956 ). These sources are considered both individual and societal creations. Applying this notion to organizational history the actor is both the product and the producer of history (Mason, McKenney and Copeland, 1997) . The discourses analysed here is based mainly on internal and confidential texts. The primary documents are a so called Customer Relationship Reengineering White Paper signed by CEO Gerstner in 1994, the worldwide internal journal ' Think', and confidential internal transparencies presentations also signed by the IBM CEO or its key staff. Direct observations have also been conducted by one of the authors who happened to be the planning manager of the CRM reengineering in IBM Corporation in the USA in 1993 and 1994.
From an epistemological point of view, the analysis is an application of the two interpretations of discourses proposed by general hermeneutics as discussed in section I above. To recap, the two general hermeneutic interpretations of these texts can be undertaken as: 1) the psychological interpretation of the author and 2) the grammatical interpretation of the text itself with attention to the context in which the text was generated and which influenced the author through language. Language, rather the expression of ideas through language itself, is a product of its time and social context. This confrontation between these two interpretations is the b asis of the dynamic of the hermeneutic cycle generated by the iterative examination of the text.
Because this is on going research and because of space limitations, the present paper more narrowly focuses its attention on identifying and analyzing a single set of top-level management narratives; namely those claiming to be representative of different organizational stakeholders. Nevertheless, we propose also to use the sociology of Action (Touraine, 1965) to help illustrate how discourse helps, in the p resent case, persons in key high-level leadership positions in distancing an from established norms and may lead to organizational creativity, the rejection of old rules and stereotypes and finally culminate in the creation of new norms.
This field study is therefore qualitative and longitudinal. In this part, we propose to describe three phases discourse created and voiced by the IBM CEO:
1-discourse about the middle managers in early 1993 2-discourse about shareholders during the 1 st phase of the reengineering (CVM) 3-discourse about the employees during the 2 nd phase of the reengineering (CRM)
IV-THE FIELD STUDY
4.1-The CEO discourse about middle managers
Vignette #2: April 1993, a new CEO is appointed by the IBM board of directors. Lou Gerstner, the first CEO from outside the firm replaced the previous CEO, John Ackers, who had been dismissed because of the declining financial results of the Corporation. Beginning in 1991 and for the first time in its history IBMs net financial performance was negative. This event sent shock waves through its industry. Upon his appointment Mr. Gerstner spent three months listening to all his chief officers, including divisional and functional unit heads as well as the chiefs of the various international operations. He concluded that IBMs problems arose from decentralized and highly independent operations in which there was no cross functional interaction which might leverage IBMs talents and economies of scale. Thus the discourse as initially set and expressed by Mr. Gerstner quickly became a discourse about middle management fiefdoms, and flawed organizational, and performance measures.
We examine this discourse from the perspective the structure, the performance measurement and the methods advocated by middle managers.
Structural assessment
The discourse about middle management is told by the CEO mainly through the quartely worldwide internal journal called " Think". Think had been a venerable mainstay at IBM almost from its inception. However the former CEO had suppressed the journal in the late 80's. His rational was that such an internal communication published from main headquarters and in English contradicted his policy to foster decentralization and independent operations by smaller corporate units. Lou Gerstner revived Think in 1993. The first reconstituted issue talks about a "new IBM" and defines a set of very general principles. At the time each division interpreted those principles freely so they might defend their own interests. Some statements like "the market is the driving force behind everything we do" were sometimes interpreted and operationalized as " we must work more with the customer and less internally". While the world expected Lou Gerstner to lay down explicit plans and establish the new IBM "strategy", he refused to do so. He opted to wait laying down general principles and listened to the recommendations filtering up from the ranks.
Will IBM be a "service company"? A "PC company"? Will it become a "worldwide company"? An affirmative question to the first question would mean to declare war to the hardware divisions. Becoming a personal computer company suggested big trouble for the mainframe division, the midrange systems division, the software divisions and the service divisions. Becoming a worldwide Company would mean definitely separating IBM US and the IBM Corporation, and therefore giving more power to Europe that had been yielding more revenue than IBM US since the late 80's. The IBM partition is therefore linked to internal conflicts between product divisions (mainframe, workstations, PCs, soft, services), between geographical divisions (Asia vs. North America, Europe vs. North America, Italy vs. France an so on) and between the various functional units such as marketing and sales, finance, administrative and manufacturing.
Performance measurement
During this period IBM corporate performance measures were short term oriented. The last corporate 5 year strategic plan had been conducted 1989 and the long range planning process was officially ended in 1993. The rationale for abandoning long range planning was that the environment was changing too rapidly to make long range strategic planning feasible. The director of strategy in IBM France declared in 1993:
"We are an enterprise unable to invest and move (…) " Anything that takes more than one year is impossible to do".
Resources, especially the I.S. resources, were increasingly being devoted to control activities. Those activities were already over-computerized compared to the customer related activities. Almost all internal the investment was oriented towards the strengthening of the "control hydra" that monopolized the lion's share of the I.S. investment budget. The only justification allowed for I.S. investment u ntil 1989 was the internal rate of return. Despite attempts to include a new "competitive" or "strategic" justification for new IS development only I.S. projects that had a computable break-event point of less than 2 years were considered. The focus had become on productivity rather than on flexibility.
Methods
At the level of corporate organization process improvement methods were based on Total Quality Management. Yet the technique was generally seen as a failure. World VicePresident Quality and Reengineering Wilson Lowery wrote " There was nearly no links between divisions …[neither].. among them and between countries. This is why TQM was unable to bring back IBM to competitiveness " (IBM Think Review, p. 6). Under the TQM plan each function was optimized to the detriment of cross-functional linkages. Coordination was attempted through the normalization of results. On the IS development side, only structured methodologies were officially used (Axial, SADDT, Merise). IBM France general management concluded in 1989 that the most strategic processes were the least likely to be computerized (Monod and Rowe 1993 ). Yet those same processes were also the most cross functional.
Thus this discourse corresponds to the archetype (figure 9) in which middle management: 1) impose performance measurement based on productivity; 2 ) advocate for divisional structure and a decentralized and mechanistic management system; 3) recommend total quality management methods and structured methodologies, and where; 4) control is held by the middle managers themselves. Figure 9 : the discourse of middle managers
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4.2-The CEO discourse about stakeholders
After completing his three-month assessment CEO Gerstner determined that IBMs primary problems arose from creation of functional fiefdoms being held and run by middle managers. With that determination the CEO's discourse focused on reengineering as a solution to IBMs malaise. The justification used to engage in corporate reengineering plan was to protect shareholder interests. The following is a summary CEO discourse about shareholders.
Again we use the framework of performance measurement, structure and methods.
Performance measurement
To provide a clearer picture of corporate p erformance for the shareholder, corporate productivity metrics were represented for IBM as a whole rather than being targeted at the divisional level. The metric remained one of productivity (i.e., return on investment) measured upwards from the divisional level. But this productivity metric would for now only be measured at the global level of the corporation. With this cumulative corporate analysis IBM reported net results as culminating in a loss of almost $ 8.9 billion. Between 1990 and 1993, the stock value had dropped by two-thirds reflecting poor performance and the financial market's adjusted expectations for IBMs future. The first article in the special issue on reengineering in "Think", opens as follows:
" First, stop the hemorrhage. Then, lose weight. Then, rebuild a musculature " (…) AMBULANCE CALL. One year ago, the Corporation was in state of hemorrhage of its cash flows, within the red ink of its quarterly losses (…). Here is the origin of the objectives of reducing the $ 8 billion of structural expenses until 1996." (p.4)
Methods
The twin financial objectives, of returning to profitability and of stemming the red ink were met through headcount reduction. The number of IBM employees was cut from from 383,000 employees in 1989 to 301,000 in 1992, 256,000 in 1993 and finally to 220,000 in 1994. But functioning an enterprise with half of the workforce became problematic, a point acknowledged by CEO Gerstner.
"Headcount reduction alone was not sufficient. Additional reduction would have been counter-productive." (p. 1) Thus CEO Lou Gerstner decided in September 1993 to continue the reengineering by "reducing the low value work" (p. 1), without any other headcount reduction. With this pronouncement reengineering adopted a performance measurement that linked the return of the global level of the corporation with the productivity of local units. With this change local units were to retask themselves from a divisional orientation to a crossfunctional process orientation. Moreover as we shall see below, they idea was also to redirect the firm to a more customer-centric way of seeing the business.
"In order to continue the savings in structure costs, nine reengineering project have been launched at the worldwide level. Among these nine p rojects, Customer Relationship Management (CRM) (marketing and sales processes) require the biggest workload on each continent" (p. 2).
The first round of Customer Relationship Management reengineering CRM reengineering, (although initially called Customer Value Management or CVM) was launched in late 1993. The objective was to reduce the high level of sales expenses "… found that IBM Marketing and Sales (as opposed to Manufacturing and Development) spent $ 7.8 billions for CRM" (p. 3) Reengineering teams meet in Thornwood, New York and started designing processes and the related information systems to support the newly designed processes. These teams focused on process modeling with its output being process diagrams. These diagrams were translated into procedures manuals, called "rules books". The assumption was that the divisional operational units were going to change their ways of working through the usage of theses "rules books". The CVM reengineering was implemented in the United States in late 1993.
It was a total and complete failure. Operational units flatly refused to fall in line, insisting instead that they must have not "rule books" but "tools kits" for flexibility and redesign.
Structure
A simple diagnosis for this failure would have been employee or unit 'resistance to change.' We believe that the reason was more complex and relates to the interests and proclivities of the analysts. Phase one, CVM failed because the reengineering teams of pure analysts were devoted only to financial interests. The new management system was centralized in New York and was top-down directed. It was hierarchical and non participative design. Its approach was mechanistic because organizational coordination was supposed to be performed through rules and procedures. The employees resisted and recognized the CVM as a form of "a new taylorism". Much of the process redesign work 1993 was targeted at "uniformization" of all operations through "standardization of processes".
Once redesigned, we will implement best practices and their supporting integrated information systems in a uniform way across the four geographic units of IBM Marketing and Services" (page 1).
The structure indicated by the reengineering is therefore a functional structure.
4.3-The discourse about employees and customers
After the CVM reengineering failure, the CEO discourse evolved once again in 1994. We next present a performance measurement, structural and the methods analysis of this newly evolved discourse.
Performance measurement
The critical goal of returning to profitability was addressed through headcournt reductions and supplementing profits with one time income realization though the sale of real estate and defunct divisions. The sale of non-performing units was part of the objective to reduce low value work. By ridding themselves of units marginal to the overall bottom line, IBM realized quick income used to show a quick turnaround. But clearly staff reductions and sales of business units and properties were not sustainable practices in a going concern. So after addressing the objectives of "stopping the hemorrhaging" and "losing weight", in 1994 attention was turned to a third objective; namely, to " rebuild a musculature". In an internal White Paper CEO Gerstner writes: " During last years, we made great progress in size reduction of our workforce and in the creation of a expense structure more competitive. …Nevertheless, those reductions contributed to the decline of our customer satisfaction and of our revenue. …We must reduce our workload and change the way we approach markets" (page 1).
The rebuilding of "musculature" required that IBM reposition itself from the "Off the Rack" marketing and moving more towards the "Mass Customization" market Figure 10 illustrates IBM's corporate perception of where IBM was positioned vis a vis its desired market position. Figure 10 comes from an the internal "white paper" signed by Lou Gerstner entitled Customer Relationship Management and distributed to all collaborators. It illustrates how IBM had 70% of its activities in a markets that were declining at the rate of 1% a year, compared to its competitors that had only 50% on average in those decreasing markets. The growing market was "Mass Customization" with a rate of 10% per year. IBM had 15% position in this market; the average for its competitors was 36%. The "MassCustomization" market required IBM to dynamically combine previously existing "modules" of hardware, software and services in order to respond to a customer request. This dynamic adaptation implies a radical transformation of IBM structures and processes. Therefore, the primary IBM performance metric was going to have to evolve from one of productivity to one of flexibility.
Structure
The management system, only inferred in the first phase of the reengineering process, now becomes more explicit: "The aim of the Customer Relationship reengineering is to redesign the sales practices and their support performed by the IBM personnel in contact with customer and by the support teams… Once implemented, CRM management system will substantially respond to IBM's customers' request for change. IBM customers' imperatives will be addressed with a more specialized, responsible and accessible IBM sales and support team. The IBM team will be supported by I/T applications and information that will enable them to locate the right resource and solutions for their customers, and to quickly tailor these solutions to meet their customers' unique needs. We have created an environment for team work and sharing". The management system was seen as becoming clearly decentralized and organic. Freer access to information was an essential part of the IS redesign aim and the coordination mechanism is mutual adjustment between professionals (employees).
This final goal state is described in the last page of the white paper: "we will have created an environment for teamwork and sharing" (p. 24). A greater willingness for knowledge sharing is stressed:
"We must capitalize on opportunities by leveraging the sharing, of information, skills and intellectual capital created during these engagements, between geographies and divisions of IBM" (p. 5).
Therefore, the structural objectives changed from creating structures privileging productivity towards creating one enhancing flexibility. The target structure was to be innovative.
Methods
During this period both reengineering and ISD methods changed radically. They became user-driven, based on emergence for organizational transformation and on socio-technical methods for IS development. "Cooperation" became a watchword. Where Vice-President of Reengineering for North America, Robin Sternbergh wrote of the previous era. "Nobody came to say us 'don't cooperate', but this is how things went in IBM Marketing and Services. There are probably many reasons for that : geographic fiefdoms, ancient conventions systems, risk aversion. But there is only on way to improve things: reengineering (...) " (IBM Think review, 1994, p. 9) . CEO Gerstner declared underscored the new ethic of internal cooperation:
"If I learn that somebody refused to contribute to a customer request, he would better hide deep in the ground".
This discourse is summarized (figure 11) as follows: 1) it Claims to represent the employees and customers as stakeholders; 2) it argues for performance measurement based on flexibility; 3) it advocates for a decentralized and organic management system (innovative structure), and; 4) recommends and capitalizes on socio-technical approaches for IS development and emergence method for organizational transformation. 
Limits
This research encounters the classical limits of any historical and hermeneutic enterprise. The first historical methodological limit of this study is that the two year period presented here is drawn from a rich thirty year period serving as a contextual backdrop to this period of radical transformation. We choose this period because Mr. Gerstner's appointment as CEO represents a significant transitional marker. His appointment as an outsider represented a profound break with tradition. IBM itself points to his appointment in 1993 as the beginning of a new era and a new IBM. But an astute reader of IBM annual reports will note that the headcount downsizing began in the two-year period prior to his tenure. So we are in fact picking up a continuing process of transformation and restructuring in midstream. There are those who have argued that had Mr Gerstner not been hired changes already in process at IBM and a strengthening economy whould have saved IBM. This is a question we are pursuing in further research. But it remains unaddressed in this research.
A methodological limit is that the research presented here rests on only three primary textual sources: a confidential internal document (White Paper), confidential presentations and an internal journal. It also relies on direct observations of one of the authors. Clearly other sources, both internal and external could be commandeered as warrants to the efficacy of the narrative. Space limitations prevent that now. The research continues however and as it unfolds more and more sources are folded into the narrative. Nevertheless, two classical elements of an historical study have not been presented in this short paper. Those are external sources and a formal chronology. External sources like press releases, analysis from the competitors and financial analysts reports would have been necessary to shed a different light of these narratives. A general chronology would also bring important milestones that could be a basis of intersubjective understanding. Some of those elements may be found in an extended analysis of the IBM transformation (Monod, , 1997 A second methodological limit comes from the use of general hermeneutics. As far as each the written sources used in this research are signed by CEO Gerstner, one can undertake a psychological interpretation of his discourses and consider them as the manifestation of the author's willingness to communicate his corporate policy to other stakeholders either reading these documents or hearing recounts of the related discourse. Psychological data about Lou Gerstner could have been evaluated here. Nevertheless, the grammatical interpretation of the same discourse finds words directly related to the espoused interests of an external stakeholders, especially the shareholders. For instance the frequent reference to "savings", "productivity",and "standardization". Can the author of these texts be discarded and replaced only by the determinants of the context? This question refers to the first contribution on the methodological level: pluralism.
VI. Contributions
In the IS literature the identification of a discourse is implicitly linked to an epistemological position. These positions are often presented as divided between positivism, interpretivism and critical social theory (Chua, 1983) . In the positivist position, a discourse arises from the examination of explicit texts coming from a single authoritative source (Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1965) . In the interpretivist position many sources can be heard as discourse, both written text and more informal sources of data. But in general only explicit narratives are admitted for analysis (Lee, 1999) . A third position, Critical Social Theory, also listens to "unspoken others." The role of a researcher is to uncover and pay attention to those voices that may have been silenced or those positions which may be unwritten (Burrell and Morgan's 1979, Baskerville and Truex 1999) . In this research, the pluralist epistemology (Kant, 1781) combining hermeneutics, history and sociology of action allowed to present the discourse of the executive (positivism) that could be interpreted as giving voice to other discourses (interpretivism). Each of this discourse corresponding to some stakeholders, it appears that others stakeholders voices have no access to the executive (Critical Social Theory).
The second contribution is on the theoretical level. In organization theory, there is an opposition between rational decision theory (Simon 1977) and garbage can (Cohen March and Olson) overtaken by the structure theory of Mintzberg (1979) . This opposition has its counterpart in sociology. That is between interactionism, doing away with any reference to social norms in the course of the exchange, and sociological determinism, which reduces change to the confrontation with a enemy, to a cultural transformation imposed from without. The combination of post-modernist analysis of discourse as shaped by external powers (Foucault, 1972) and the Sociology of Action (Touraine, 1965) allows us once again to overcome this opposition. The Sociology of Action questions how distancing from established norms leads to organizational creativity, the rejection of old rules or nonsocially regulated emotions and finally the creation of new norms. We saw in the IBM reengineering case that this creation of new norm always foreshadowed a structure that serves best the interests of a given stakeholder (e.g., the functional structure for the shareholder, the innovative structure for the customers). At the present level of analysis the IBM reengineering case describes an actor surrounded by political forces. From most of the observers, the CEO's attitude illustrated his willingness to steadfastly maintain that he was indeed the "shareholder advocate" in 1993, and then morph into the "customer advocate" in 1994. The question of knowing if this behaviour was manipulative, opportunistic or manipulated by the outside is beyond the scope of our research. But it also illustrates how other views, while important were never heard at all.
VII. Prospective topics and Further Research
Stakeholder theory (Hills and Jones 1992) has been used but certainly has not been verified in this paper. The CEO does not speak for all stakeholders and does not act as if he was the agent of all stakeholders : for instance rank and file employees, government and local communities are not mentioned by him at all. Nor were they explicitly considered in the process of the reengineering. And when Lou Gerstner talks about the employees, we do not know if by this general category he only means high performing employees contributing to the firm objectives. Stakeholder agency theory naturally leads towards a contextual interpretation: the discourse is more under the influence of external forces than under the control of the author. We wonder if this is akin to the point Parnas (1986) makes in saying that all surviving design involves ex-post rationality applied to a messy and uncertain process. Indeed, the victors wrote the official history the story has focused on the happy ending and the heroic nature of the struggle to survive. One can go to the current IBM web site and read the 2001 annual report to see how the reengineering is still playing o ut in its organizational life. The history summarized therein represents a remarkable effort at spin control and presenting a rational face on a very messy socially constructed process. But the currently presented officail story and indeed the story recounted above also has elements which have been untold, a darker and more tragic side in which villains resisted survival and where innocent were sacrificed to a 'greater good.' It is a story in which whole communities were laid waste in battle of survival and lives were irrevocably changed, some for the worse. Clearly there are lessons to have been learned from the story, but not all these lessons come from the tales told by the winners though their stories have great power, interest and benefit. Other lessons will arise from the depths of the experiences of others who did not survive the transition, persons who by choice or by enforced departure left the organization in the midst of its survival throes. Others still may come from within the communities regions deeply impacted by the transformation of a great manufacturing corporation into a bird of a different feather, an organization retasked to a greater service orientation.
This research also suggests other theoretical challenges yet to be resolved. One is, how might we link stakeholder-agency theory with political and power interests. Various social theorists lend to an understanding of differing types of rationality that help understand this linkage. For instance, Weber (1913) identifies instrumental, substantive, normatively regulated kinds of rationality. Habermas, in his Theory of Communicative Action (1984) extends Weber's distinctions and shows how these may be present in certain kinds of communicative acts, which he terms, substantive, communicative and argumentative. Previous work has tried to identify such linkages (Truex, 1991 , Truex and Klein 1993 , Chin, 2000 Additional theoretical development could lead to a more comprehensive theory of narratives for language and context mapping in the analysis of the organizational discourse about information technology. But this is the topic for another day.
